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COMMENT
THEFT LOSS DEDUCTIONS AS RELIEF FOR
THE SMALL INVESTOR
With the development of federal corporation law and the imple-
mentation of that law by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), shareholders are becoming increasingly aware of the rights and
remedies available to them whenever they find themselves injured as a
proximate result of a securities fraud.' In addition to securities law
remedies, tax law affords some relief for losses due to securities fraud,
but only under relatively limited circumstances. As will be discussed,
none of the presently available remedies are particularly effective for
the small investor. This Comment will propose an alternative which
would provide greater tax relief for the small investor than has been
heretofore available. That alternative is the theft loss deduction.2
I. THE PLIGHT OF THE SMALL INVESTOR WHO IS A
VICTIM OF A SECURITIES FRAUD
The investor who has been the victim of a securities fraud is likely
to discover that the fraudulent activity caused his security to decline
significantly in value. There are two basic ways in which the fraudulent
activity can cause a loss in value. First, the fraud could have been per-
petrated in order to conceal the fact that the corporate entity backing
the security is worth less than previously believed. Second, evidence
that a security has been tainted by fraud causes the SEC to take action
which usually affects the market adversely. Suspension of trading3 and
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW (1967-1977) [hereinafter cited as A. BROMBERG];
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW (1972) [hereinafter cited as W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr].
1. "In its quasi-judicial jurisdiction over violations of the securities laws by broker-dealers
and in its powers to investigate and publish violations by anyone, [the SEC] has developed many
of the important precedents in the area [of securities fraud] .... Activities of this kind have
called investor attention to specific violations and general rights, thereby encouraging injured par-
ties to sue." 4 A. BROMBERO § 10.1, at 234.
2. Defrauded investors are beginning to turn to the theft loss deduction as other oppor-
tunitites for relief become unavailable. For example, investors in Home-Stake Production Co. lost
approximately $120,000,000 as a result of a securities fraud. D. MCCLINTICK, STEALING FROM
THE RICH 301-03 (1977). Because other avenues of relief do not provide adequate compensation
for their loss, investors in the Home-Stake oil swindle are currently attempting to claim some
relief for their loss under the theft loss provision of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. 298 n.4.
3. Section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
If in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors so require, the
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other types of SEC enforcement action-injunctions, administrative
proceedings and criminal proceedings-are events by which the market
is formally apprised that certain issuers are allegedly in violation of the
federal securities laws.4 SEC releases generally indicate the nature of
the violation.' Although market surveillance, the dissemination of in-
formation obtained pursuant to surveillance and the resultant enforce-
ment action are intended to protect investors, one inevitable result of
SEC enforcement action is a negative market reaction in the security's
price.6 The suspension order may apply for several years,7 thereby sub-
Commission is authorized summarily to suspend trading in any security (other than an
exempted security) for a period not exceeding ten days ....
15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1976). See also 2 A. BROMBERO § 7.1, at 143.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976) (injunction proceedings); id. § 78o(b)(4) (administrative pro-
ceedings); id. § 78ff (criminal proceedings). See also 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (1977):
Where it appears after investigation orotherwise that there has been a violation of
any of the provisions of the acts administered by the Commission or the rules or regula-
tions thereunder, the Commission may take one or more of the following actions: institu-
tion of administrative proceedings looking to the imposition of remedial sanctions,
initiation of injunction proceedings in the courts, and, in the case of a willful violation,
reference of the matter to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.
5. [1977] 1 FED. SEC. L. REa. (CCH) % 323(1 1). The statutory basis of the SEC's authority is
section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
The Commission is authorized, in its discretion, to publish information concernin
any such violations, and to investigate any facts, conditions, practices, or matters which it
may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of such provisions, in the pre-
scnbing of rules and regulations under this title, or in securing information to serve as a
basis for recommending further legislation concerning the matters to which this title re-
lates.
15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976). See also Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC, 198 F. Supp. 508 (D.D.C. 1961).
6. 2 A. BROMBERG § 7.1, at 143 n.1l.
7. See Sloan v. SEC, 98 S. Ct. 1702 (1978), a'g 547 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1976) (SEC has no
power to summarily roll-over the ten-day suspension period pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 781(k)
(1976)). See also Brief for Petitioner, Ecological Science Corp. v. SEC, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) % 93,663 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (allegation that suspension of stock
from trading for fifty-one ten-day periods constitutes a grave abuse of discretion).
In both Sloan and Ecological Science Corp. the SEC had exercised its power to suspend
trading pursuant to section 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See note 3 supra. How-
ever, in 1975 Congress expanded § 120) to include a power to suspend trading. Consequently, that
section allows the Commission
to suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or to revoke the registration of a
security, if the Commission finds on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing,
that the issuer of such security has failed to comply with any provision of tIs chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. §7810) (1976). Apparently, Congress now intends for the SEC to use section 120) for
suspensions of extended duration. See S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 105-06 (1975) ("With
this change, the Commission is expected to use this section rather than its ten-day suspension
power, in cases of extended duration.").
Regarding the SEC's use of its power to suspend trading, the concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall in the Sloan case noted that "the Commission has used
§ 12(k), or its predecessor statutes to suspend trading in a security for up to 13 years . . . .And,
although the 13-year suspension is an extreme example, the record is replete with suspensions
lasting the better part of a year." Sloan, 98 S. Ct. at 1714-15. See also S. REP. No. 379, 88th
Cong., Ist Sess. 66-67 (1963) ("The [Senate Committee on Banking and Currency] recognizes that
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stantially reducing the value of the stock and eliminating the market in
which the shareholder could sell his shares in order to realize whatever
value remained in his asset.
Shareholders may bring a direct action8 for damages under certain
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, for example, section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19349 and Rule lOb-5.10 How-
ever, a shareholder frequently is unable to pursue such relief, either
because he is unable to meet the standing requirements of Rule lOb-5 1'
or because the corporate defendant may not possess sufficient assets
with which to compensate the shareholder. 2 Further, where the indi-
vidual loss is relatively small, private actions to recover damages are
suspension of trading in a security is a drastic step and that prolonged suspension of trading may
impose considerable hardship on stockholders.").
8. It is important to note the distinction between a direct personal or representative suit and
a derivative suit. In a derivative suit the alleged wrong was not done to the plaintiff personally, but
to the corporation. In a direct personal suit, "the corporation is charged with invasion of the
stockholder's independent right." W. CARY, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 733 (4th ed.
abridged 1970) (quoting Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 99 (1957)).
"A representative action is a class action or a direct personal action brought on behalf of those
'similarly situated."' W. CARY, supra, at 729 n.2 (quoting Reifsnyder v. Pittsburgh Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co., 405 Pa. 142, 144 n.2, 173 A.2d 319, 320 n.2 (1961)). Theft loss deductions should be
available to investors only when corporate officers have violated an antifraud provision of the
securities laws to which the investor has a direct personal or representative action since a theft loss
deduction would be compensating the shareholder for a personal loss.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
11. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v.
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952) (purchase-seller
requirement). See text accompanying notes 94-96 infra.
12. For example, a corporation in bankruptcy must distribute assets to creditors in accord-
ance with the provisions of bankruptcy law. However, it is unlikely that there will be any assets to
distribute to shareholders since creditors of the corporation must be compensated first. H. HENN,
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 383, at 822-23 (2d ed. 1970).
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generally brought iii the form of class actions.' 3 In Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 14 the Supreme Court held that representatives of a common-
question class action must bear the cost of giving individual notice to
all members of a class who can be identified and located. I This consid-
erable expense may preclude small investors, as a practical matter,
from seeking relief.16 Consequently, the only relief that may be avail-
able is a tax deduction for the loss.' 7
Section 165(c)(2) of the Internal'Revenue Code allows an individ-
ual a deduction for losses incurred in any transaction entered into for
profit, though not connected with a trade or business, and losses of all
non-business property resulting from fire, storm, shipwreck or other
casualty or from theft are deductible under section 165(c)(3).' s Section
165(f) allows a capital loss arising from the sale or exchange of securi-
ties' 9 and section 165(g) allows a deduction for securities which have
become worthless during the taxable year.
20
All of the above provisions, with the exception of section 165(c)(3),
13. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968) vacated and remanded on
other grounds 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
14. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
I5. Id. at 173-77.
16. Id. at 178-79.
17. "If the class suit is to enable a single plaintiff with a small individual claim to represent
an entire class of victims with an enormous total claim, Eisen has destroyed its utility unless that
single plaintiff is very wealthy." Lyons, Class Actions, 1974/75 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 349, 356.
"Unfortunately, even notice by publication could be prohibitively expensive if the class is very
large." Id. 360. But see Patrick, The Securities Class Action/or Damages Comes of Age (1966-
1974), 29 Bus. LAW. 159 (Special Issue 1974). The requirement of individual notice "will proba-
bly not have much impact on class actions under the federal securities acts." Id. 164.
18. I.R.C. § 165 provides:
(a) General Rule-There shall be allowed any loss sustained during the taxable
year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(c) Limitation on Losses of Individuals--In the case of an individual, the deduc-
tion under subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not con-
nected with a trade or business; and
(3) losses of property not connected with a trade or business, if such losses arise
from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft. A loss described
in this paragraph shall be allowed only to the extent that the amount of loss to
such individual arising from each casualty, or from each theft, exceeds
$100....
19. I.R.C. § 165(0 provides:
Capital Losses-Losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed
only to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212.
20. I.R.C. § 165(g) provides:
Worthless Securities-
(1) General Rule-If any security which is a capital asset becomes worthless during
the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall, for purposes of this subtitle, be
treated as a loss from the sale or exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a
capital asset.
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require that the shareholder's loss receive capital loss treatment.2'
Treatment as a capital loss involves several limitations22 which render
the above provisions an ineffectual means of relief for the small inves-
tor.23 Capital loss treatment is unsatisfactory for the taxpayer who has
little or no capital gains with which to offset a severe loss since such
treatment may delay tax recovery for the loss and, in effect, render the
taxpayer's assets inaccessible for an indefinite period of time.24
Another alternative is to allow the small investor a deduction
against ordinary income for a theft loss, thereby enabling the taxpayer
21. There is a presumption that securities sold or exchanged are capital assets and as such
are subject to capital gain or loss treatment. One exception to this presumption occurs when the
taxpayer is a dealer, I.R.C. § 1221(1) defines one type of non-capital asset as stock in trade, inven-
tory, or property held primarily for sale to customers. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 374-75 (2d ed. 1973).
In an attempt to encourage investment in small business enterprise, small business corpora-
tion stock which becomes worthless during the taxable year is deductible in that year as against
ordinary income. I.R.C. §§ 1242-1244. See J. CHOMMIE, supra, at 382. See also note 45 infra.
22. The first limitation is that capital losses are deductible to the extent that there are capital
gains. I.R.C. § 1211(b)(1). However, if losses exceed gains, the Code authorizes a deduction
against ordinary income, but not greater than $3,000. I.R.C. § 121 1(b)(2). For purposes of this
section, taxable income is computed without regard to personal exemptions and without regard to
capital gains and losses. I.R.C. § 1211(b)(3). The computation calls for short-term loss to off-set
taxable income on a dollar for dollar basis; long-term loss offsets taxable income on a two for one
basis. I.R.C. § 1211. Lastly, a capital loss not offset in the current year is carried forward to the
taxpayer's succeeding tax year and is treated as if it were actually realized in that succeeding year.
I.R.C. § 1212(b).
23. Small investors generally do not have significant capital gains and a securities fraud
frequently results in a drastic reduction of value. "While more than 27 million people do own
some common stocks, still less than 1 in 10 gets an appreciable return." P. SAMUELSON, ECONOM-
ics 90 (8th ed. 1970). Moreover, the small investor represents a significant percentage of those 27
million people, as evidenced by recent studies which "show that in the typical giant corporation,
all management together-officers and directors-holds only about 3 percent of the outstanding
common stock. The largest single minority ownership groups typically hold only about a fifth of
all voting stock." Id. In 1963, 84.5% of the 200 largest corporations had no group of stockholders
owning as much as 10% of the outstanding stock. Id. 90 n.9 (citing Lamer, Ownership and Control
in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations 1929 and 1963, 56 AM. EcON. REv. 778, 780 (1966)).
24. For example, suppose the taxpayer has no short-term or long-term capital gain (STCG
or LTCG), no short-term capital loss (STCL), $100,000 of long-term capital loss (LTCL) and
$50,000 taxable income. Under section 121 l(b)(1)(C) the following computation results:
(Net STCL-Net LTCG)=(0-0)=0
"/2(Net LTCL-Net STCG)=I/2 ($l00,000-0)
equals $50,000.
Since long-term losses offset capital gains on a two to one ratio, the taxpayer's maximum deduc-
tion is $50,000. However, in this example the taxpayer has no capital gains with which to offset the
loss and must resort to section 1211(b)(2) which allows a deduction against taxable income not
greater than $3,000 for any given taxable year. Thus, in this hypothetical, the taxpayer is entitled
to deduct $3,000 from ordinary income. Under section 1212(b), the taxpayer is entitled to carry
over $47,000 to his next taxable year. However, given the same fact situation, the taxpayer again
receives only a $3,000 deduction from ordinary income and a carryover of $44,000. Assuming that
all other factors remain equal, it will take the taxpayer seventeen years to deduct the loss.
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to deduct a loss in the current year that is limited only by the taxpayer's
income level.25 A loss from theft of an asset held less than one year is
an ordinary loss.26 However, a theft loss of an income producing asset
held for one year or more is subject to treatment under section 1231 as
an involuntary conversion.27 Under 1231(a), total losses and gains re-
sulting from involuntary conversions must be netted. If losses attributa-
ble to involuntary conversions exceed gains attributable to involuntary
conversions, then, pursuant to a 1969 tax amendment,2 8 the net loss will
be treated as an ordinary loss and section 1231 does not apply.29 If
section 1231 does apply the net result is either a long term capital gain
or an ordinary loss. 30 However, in most casualty and theft loss cases,
the losses usually exceed the gains, thereby circumventing section 1231
altogether and permitting taxpayer ordinary loss treatment.3 1 Thus, the
theft loss deduction is more advantageous to the defrauded stockholder
than are other Code provisions which offer only capital loss treatment.
Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued two revenue
rulings concerning taxpayers who sought theft loss deductions for
25. This is in comparison with the capital loss provision which limits the deduction against
ordinary income to $3,000. See note 22 supra.
26. Under Section 1231, capital assets held for one year or less are distinguished from those
held for more than one year, ie, short-term capital assets as opposed to long-term capital assets.
Section 1231 only discusses involuntary conversions as applied to long-term capital assets. I.R.C. §
123 1(a). Nonetheless, "[i]f a nonbusiness asset [nonbusiness assets may be capital assets] is held
less than six months [one year as of 19781, an ordinary loss is available without being subject to
the netting treatment of section 1231." Schwartz, Tax Losses: Casualty, Th, Wagering, War and
Expropriation in TAX LOSSES 62 (P. Berger ed. 1974). See also I.R.S. PuB. No. 547, TAX INFOR-
MATION ON DISASTERS, CASUALTY LOSSES AND THEFTS 1 32,627, at 8 (1978).
27. I.R.C. § 1231(a).
28. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 516(b), 83 Stat. 487, 646; See S. REP. No.
552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 204-07, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEWS 2027, 2239-41.
29. In the case of any involuntary conversion ... , this subsection shall not apply to such
conversion (whether resulting in gain or loss) if during the taxable year the recognized losses from
such conversions exceed the recognized gains from such conversions.
I.R.C. § 1231(a).
30. If gains from involuntary conversions exceed losses, then all such gains and losses are
characterized as section 1231 gains or losses and are subject to section 1231 treatment. Under
section 1231, all gains are totaled, as are all losses, ie., section 1231 applies to gains or losses from
sales or exchanges of property used in a trade or business and gain or loss recognized from the
involuntary conversion of property used in a trade or business and the involuntary conversion of
capital assets. If total section 1231 losses exceed total section 1231 gains, then all are charterized as
ordinary gains and losses. However, if total section 1231 gains exceed total section 1231 losses,
then all are characterized as capital gains and losses. Even though this last branch of involuntary
conversion tax formula results in capital loss treatment of the taxpayer's theft loss, the taxpayer
could not have reached such a point unless he had the gains with which to offset the loss. In other
words, ifa taxpayer must employ section 1231 treatment, the net result is either a long-term capi-
tal gain or an ordinary loss. I.R.C. § 1231(a).
31. See J. CHOMMIE, supra note 21, at 358.
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losses attributable to a securities fraud.3 2 In the first revenue ruling,33
the taxpayer purchased corporate stock through a public stock ex-
change and claimed that he had been induced to make such purchases
as a result of the encouraging financial statements issued by corporate
officers. 34 After taxpayer's purchase, the SEC suspended trading in the
corporation's stock because of insider manipulation of its market price.
Investigation revealed substantial misstatements and fraudulent state-
ments which had artificially inflated the stock's market price.35 The
corporation's petition for bankruptcy was approved and the trustee re-
ported to the court that there had been a securities fraud.36 The Service
denied the theft loss deduction on the basis that the illegal activity en-
gaged in by corporate officers did not fall within the definition of theft
for federal income tax purposes.37 The Service noted that the taxpayer
could not have been a victim of theft because he purchased his shares
on the open market. Consequently, the perpetrators of the fraud did
not have the requisite specific intent to defraud the taxpayer.38 Also,
the Service implied that the value of stock could not be the subject of
theft.39
In the second revenue ruling,40 the taxpayer purchased 10Ox shares
of stock of the Y corporation. Six years later, Y's board of directors
approved an agreement and plan for merger with X corporation. Pur-
suant to the agreement, X provided Y with detailed information about
32. Rev. Rul. 18, 1977-1 C.B. 46; Rev. Rul. 17, 1977-1 C.B. 44.
33. Rev. Rul. 17, 1977-1 C.B. 44. This first revenue ruling involved a fact situation similar to
the one in the case of Paine v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 736, af'd mem., 523 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.
1975). As in the revenue ruling, the theft loss deduction was denied.
34. 1977-1 C.B. at 44-45. In Paine v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 736, aft'dmen., 523 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir. 1975), the petitioner was unable to produce evidence showing that he had been induced
to purchase Westec Corporation stock as a result of the financial statements issued. 63 T.C. at 742.
See text accompanying note 153 infra.
35. The misstatements and fraudulent statements were as to (1) earnings and profits, (2)
mineral discoveries, (3) acquisitions or sales of properties and (4) earnings projections. Various
criminal indictments were returned against principal officers and employees of Westec. As a result
of these indictments, the president of Westec pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the federal
securities and mail fraud statutes. Other officers pleaded guilty to employing a manipulative and
deceptive device in the purchase and sale of Westec stock, creating a false appearance of active
trading that raised its price. 63 T.C. at 737-38.
36. The trustee in bankruptcy is required to report to the court any facts pertaining to fraud,
misconduct, mismanagement or irregularities in the operation of the corporation. Section 167 of
the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 567(3) (1970).
37. 1977-1 C.B. at 45.
38. "[T]he loss in value in taxpayer's stock does not come within the definition of theft, for
Federal income tax purposes, because the perpetrators of the fraud at X [corporation] did not have
the requisite specific intent to defraud the taxpayer and did not obtain possession and title to
taxpayer's property." Id.
39. Id.
40. Rev. Rul. 18, 1977-1 C.B. 46.
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its financial condition that was included in the proxy statements sent to
Y's stockholders. The agreement was approved by the shareholders,
the merger was consummated, and taxpayer received shares of X's
stock in exchange for Y stock. Upon reports of irregular activities re-
garding X corporation, all trading on public markets was suspended.
The corporation's petition for bankruptcy was approved and the trustee
reported to the court that there had been a securities fraud.41 The pur-
pose of the fraudulent activities was to keep the price of X's stock aloft
in order to clinch the merger. A class action was instituted consisting of
all former stockholders of Y corporation who sought to rescind the
1973 merger agreement because of the fraudulent inducement in-
volved. In the second ruling, the IRS concluded that a theft had oc-
curred within the bounds of federal income tax law, but denied the
theft loss deduction on the ground that, since there was a reasonable
prospect of recovering the lOSS, 42 no portion of the loss was deductible
under section 165. The Service ruled that a rescission of the Y-X
merger and consequent restoration of Y stock to its former owners or
bankruptcy reorganization served as a reasonable prospect of recov-
ery.4 3
A recent IRS publication states that a theft loss deduction is al-
lowed when a taxpayer can show that the taking of his property was
illegal under the law of the state wherein it occurred and that the taking
was done with criminal intent.' Taxpayers in the two revenue rulings
had claimed that a theft had occurred under state law. However, the
thesis of this Comment is that theft loss deductions are appropriate for
individual taxpayers who own securities which have declined in value
as a proximate result of a federal securities law antifraud violation.45
41. See note 36 supra.
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(a)(2)(i) (1960) (theft loss is not deductible under section 165(a) if
there is a reasonable prospect of recovery).
43. 1977-1 C.B. at 47.
44. I.R.S. PUB. No. 547, TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, CASUALTY LOSSES AND THEFTS
32,621 (1978).
45. The primary focus of this Comment is on the public-issue corporation. An analysis of the
applicability of the theft loss deduction to the close corporation is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. However, there may be some problems in applying the theft loss deduction to the close
corporation. First, under federal income tax law, investors who have incurred a loss in small
business stock already may be entitled to ordinary loss treatment. I.R.C. § 1244. Subject to certain
limitations, section 1244 allows an ordinary loss to individuals or partnerships on sales or ex-
changes (including transactions, such as where the taxpayer's stock holdings become worthless,
treated as sales or exchanges) of "Section 1244 stock" that would otherwise be treated as a capital
loss. I.RC. § 1244(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(a)-l(a) (1960). Section 1244(b) limits the amount of the
deduction to $25,000 (or $50,000 for a joint return). "Section 1244 stock," however, has many
limitations, some of which are that the corporation must adopt a plan to offer such stock for a
period ending not later than two years after the date on which the plan was adopted, that the
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Consequently, this Comment will argue that the IRS's two rulings were
wrongly decided. First, the definition of theft, for federal income tax
purposes, does include violations of the federal antifraud provisions of
the securities laws. Second, there exist identifiable events such that the
theft loss deductions can be conveniently and appropriately timed.
Third, these identifiable events are indicative of the fact that no reason-
able prospect of recovery for the loss exists. Finally, the securities mar-
kets facilitate the measurement of the loss by providing reliable
information as to security prices.
II. PRELUDE TO DEFINING THEFT Loss: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In developing a rationale for personal expense deductions, Profes-
sor William D. Andrews' distinguished between a rationale which is
based on income taxation objectives as opposed to one which is based
on policies extraneous to the tax system itself.47 Professor Andrews' po-
sition is that a deduction is not justified unless based on a valid intrinsic
policy consideration.48 Although extrinsic policy considerations are not
irrelevant under Professor Andrews' analysis, such considerations are
less important insofar as the objectives which they seek are best dealt
with outside the taxation system.4 9 Nonetheless, both intrinsic and ex-
issuer must qualify as a small business corporation, that stock issued by the corporation pursuant
to the plan must be issued for money or other property (not including stock and securities) and
that the corporate issuer cannot have derived over 50% of aggregate gross receipts from sources
other than royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and gains from sales or exchanges of
stock or securities. I.R.C. § 1244(c). The corporate issuer must keep detailed records to support its
qualification as a small business corporation. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(c)-l(a) (1960).
Because of the limited availability of this provision, it arguably does not provide the taxpayer a
remedy commensurate with an injury sustained as a result of a securities fraud. One cannot plan
to be a victim of theft, yet, as demonstrated above, the taxpayer must meticulously plan to elect
section 1244. Consequently, if a taxpayer were entitled to section 1244 ordinary loss treatment as
relief for a securities fraud loss, such relief would be fortuitous.
Secondly, the relationship between a shareholder and a close corporation is very different
from the relationship between a shareholder and a public-issue corporation. The shareholder in a
close corporation is generally active in the management and operation of the business. Thus, in
the close corporation there is a mixing of ownership and control, whereas ownership and control
in the public-issue corporation are substantially separated. H. HENN, supra note 12, § 257, at 507.
This distinction is significant to the extent that this Comment is concerned with the public-issue
investor's serious disadvantage in dealing with persons possessing superior knowledge, skill and
resources. See Chris-Craft Indus. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 910 (1973). The close corporation shareholder, on the other hand, has more of an oppor-
tunity to investigate statements by or about the corporation and thus his position may not warrant
theft loss deduction relief.
46. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. RE. 309 (1972).
47. Id. 312.
48. Id.
49. Id. 311. See also Note, Deining "Medical Care" The Key to Proper Application of the
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trinsic policy considerations buttress the allowance of a theft loss de-
duction.
A. The Intrinsic Policy Jus/fication.
One goal of taxation is "to distribute the cost of government fairly
by income classes (vertical equity) and among people in approximately
the same economic circumstances (horizontal equity)."50 Professor An-
drews reformulated this goal as follows: A tax deduction may be justi-
fied by demonstrating that the deduction "effectuates intrinsic personal
income tax ideals by insuring that only 'real income' comprises the in-
come tax base."'" In other words, it is only by determining the appro-
priate income base that the taxpayer is fairly taxed.
In this analysis, Professor Andrews used Henry Simons' definition
of "real income" as the sum of aggregate personal consumption during
the taxable year, plus the change in taxpayer's accumulation of goods
and services between the beginning and end of the taxable year.52
Simons' theory defines income in terms of uses, instead of defining it in
terms of sources.5 3 Clearly, there are two uses for money, namely, con-
sumption and saving. 4 The first element in Simons' definition, how-
ever, includes "all the taxpayer's ultimate, potentially beneficial
expenditures made as a result of personal choices from among the
many gratifications (goods or services) available in the distributive sec-
tor."'55 In other words, the consumption component encompasses only
that which the taxpayer voluntarily consumes as opposed to personal
consumption as to which the taxpayer either actually or effectively has
no choice. The second element represents savings since it includes all
the additions to the taxpayer's accumulated wealth.56 Professor An-
drews views the intrinsic role of personal deductions as compensation
to the taxpayer whenever money is expended for anything other than
MedicalExpense Deduction, 1977 DuKE L.J. 909, 911-12 (discussing Professor Andrews' theory as
applied to the medical expense deduction).
50. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 5 (Brookings Institution 1966).
51. Note, supra note 49, at 911. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 330.
52. "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question." H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50
(1938).
53. Andrews, supra note 46, at 320.
54. P. SAMuELSON, supra note 23, at 193-207. "Income is one of the most important determi-
nants of consumption (food, clothing, total) and of savings." Id. 206.
55. Note, supra note 49, at 912. For an explanation of this first element see Andrews, supra
note 46, at 320-22; Note, supra note 49, at 912-13.
56. Andrews, supra note 46, at 320-22.
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personal consumption and savings.57 Thus, for example, the medical
expense deduction is intrinsically sound, since extraordinary medical
expenditures are involuntary, intermediate expenditures which are not
included in the Simons' definition of real income but which nonetheless
reduce money income.-8 Likewise, the theft loss deduction may be jus-
tified by reference to intrinsic matters of tax policy.
The theft loss deduction and. the medical expense deduction are
parallel in several respects in that they both compensate for events
which are unusual, involuntary, unpredictable and may exhaust a large
proportion of the taxpayers' total income in a particular year.59 Clearly,
loss due to theft is not included in the Simons' definition of personal
consumption. Aggregate personal consumption is that component of
real income which accounts for expenditures. However, the victim of a
theft has involuntarily parted with his property and, in fact, has con-
sumed nothing.6" Thus, such an expenditure cannot properly be in-
cluded in a taxpayer's income base. The accumulation of goods and
service component does not include taxpayer's theft loss since it ac-
counts solely for the accretion of wealth. Thus, theft losses do not re-
duce the real income base despite the fact that such losses actually
reduce money income. Consequently, a deduction is necessary in order
to compensate the taxpayer for the loss, thereby returning the taxpayer
to the real income base from which his taxes may be fairly assessed.
B. The Extrinsic Policy Justlfcation.
Despite the fact that Professor Andrews views extrinsic policy con-
siderations as inadequate justifications for a deduction, the tax system
does not operate in a void, and its effect on other societal concerns
cannot be ignored. The predicament of the shareholder must be realis-
tically examined, thereby requiring analysis not only from the view-
point of tax law, but from the viewpoint of securities law as well.
A Treasury Regulation disallows a deduction for a decline in the
value of stock "when the decline is due to a fluctuation in the market
price of the stock or other similar causes."'" One exception to this non-
recognition rule is the worthless securities deduction, which was men-
tioned earlier.6" An extrinsic policy consideration in justification of the
57. Id. 330.
58. Note, supra note 49, at 913.
59. J. PECHMAN, supra note 50, at 76.
60. See, e.g., S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposed federal criminal code) ("§ 1731.
Theft--(a) Offense-A person is guilty of an offense if he obtains or uses the property of another
with intent: (1) to deprive the other of a right to the property or a benefit of the property.").
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-4 (1960).
62. I.R.C. § 165(g). See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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worthless securities deduction is the promotion of economic growth.63
By allowing the taxpayer a deduction, Congress has provided him a tax
incentive for future investment.64 This rationale is also applicable to
the theft loss deduction.
However, a theft loss would provide the taxpayer with ordinary
loss treatment as opposed to capital loss treatment which is available
under the worthless securities provision. The rationale for allowing or-
dinary loss treatment is dependent upon a comparison between tax law
provisions and securities law provisions with the objective of making
the policies underlying those provisions, as well as the provisions them-
selves, consistent with one another.
Securities law provides the shareholder with an implied civil rem-
edy for damages when that shareholder has suffered a loss as a proxi-
mate result of a lOb-5 violation.65 Securities law does not provide
similar relief for loss due to poor business judgment. The premise in
this Comment is that a decline in the value of stock which proximately
results from a federal securities law antifraud violation is not due to the
usual risks of the marketplace. Instead, the loss is the direct result of
another's illegality; and it is a generally accepted maxim in the law that
one does not assume the risk of another's illegality. 66
Tax law, on the other hand, provides tax relief in the form of capi-
tal loss treatment for realized losses (including worthlessness) even if
the cause of that loss was the poor business judgment of the investor.
Since securities law recognizes that victims of fraud are entitled to spe-
cial consideration, it seems only consistent with securities law policies
that tax law also afford the victim of fraud special consideration via the
ordinary loss treatment available under the theft loss provision. More-
over, as will be demonstrated, the theft loss provision, using the federal
income tax definition of theft, already encompasses the securities fraud
situation.
III. THE DEFINITION OF THEFT
The term "theft" is not defined in the Code. Moreover, the theft
loss deduction, which first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1916,67 has
virtually no legislative history on which to rely for interpretive pur-
63. J. PECHMAN, supra note 50, at 5.
64. See Andrews, supra note 46, at 311 & n.4. See also Note, supra note 49, at 911.
65. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
66. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 173-74 (4th ed. 1974).
67. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a)(4), 39 Stat. 759. For background on I.R.C, §
165(c)(3), see Note, The Casualty Loss Deduction and Consumer Expectation: Section 165(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code, 36 U. CHi. L. REv. 220 (1968).
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poses.68 The regulations merely state the open-ended definition that
"theft" is "deemed to include but shall not necessarily be limited to,
larceny, embezzlement, and robbery. '69 A recent IRS publication has
defined theft, for federal income tax purposes, as a taking of property
illegal under the law of the state wherein the taking occurred if that
taking was done with criminal intent.7" An examination of the tax law
of theft loss deductions reveals that the IRS, by requiring that the tak-
ing be illegal under state law, has incorrectly stated the tax law defini-
tion of theft.
As will be demonstrated, the proper definition requires only that
the taking was illegal under the law of the jurisdiction wherein the tak-
ing occurred and that the taking was committed with criminal intent.
Furthermore, recent cases in the securities area recognize that "value"
can be the object of a criminal "taking." By applying the correct tax
law definition of theft it is clear that the federal antifraud provisions of
the 1934 Securities Exchange Act are included within that definition.
A. Must the Taking Be Illegal Under State Law?
The case most frequently cited for a definition of theft is Edwards
68. Note, supra note 67, at 220. "[Tlhe term 'theft'. . .appears to have been added to sec-
tion 165(c)(3) as an afterthought." Note, Federal Income Tax: The Dilemma ofthe Casualy Loss
Deduction, 1961 DuKE L.J. 440, 443-44. "There is no recorded explanation ofthe justification for
many of the personal deductions. Most of them have been allowed since the beginning of the
income tax." J. PECHMAN, supra note 50, at 76.
The fourth recommendation of the Committee was that individuals be permitted to
deduct all losses. . . .The intent of this recommendation was that the law should recog-
nize losses other than those incurred strictly in connection with the business or trade of
the taxpayer, such as losses of property used for investment or speculative purposes.
NATIONAL TAX ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH NATIONAL CONFERENCE 185-86 (app.) (1916)
(statement of the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916). "The most likely explanation is simply
that Congress was actuated by a notion of fairness; it sought to reduce the tax burden on a person
whose income does not reflect his economic position because his assets have been destroyed dur-
ing the taxable year." Note, supra note 67, at 220.
Moreover, there has been very little written about the theft loss provision. The following are
the only available sources specifically focusing on the theft loss deduction: Geller & Rogers, Em-
bezzlement Has Its Tax Problems, Too, 26 TAxEs 1097 (1948); Stuetzer, Embezzlement Losses.'
Timefor Deduction, 4 TAX L. REv.195 (1949); Note, Income Tax Consequences of Theft, 35 VA. L.
REv. 759 (1949); 10 VAND. L. REv. 153 (1956) (four-page analysis of Edwards v. Bromberg, 232
F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956)).
Perhaps one explanation for this dearth of analysis is that deductions for theft and casualty
combined are quantitatively unimportant as compared to total personal deductions. See C. KAHN,
PERSONAL DEDUCATIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 159-61 (1960). As of 1956, deductions
claimed for personal property losses resulting from theft and casualty never amounted to much
more than one percent of total personal deductions. Id. 159.
69. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(d) (1960).
70. I.R.S. PuB. No. 547, TAX INFORMATION ON DISASTERS, CAsuALTY LOSSES AND THEFTS
32,621 (1978).
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v. Bromberg.71 In that case, a person receiving money from a taxpayer
under the fraudulent pretense that it would be bet on a horse race em-
bezzled the money. In granting the taxpayer's claim for a theft loss de-
duction, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit emphasized the
wide spectrum of acts which are incorporated under the term "theft"
for purposes of federal income tax law. The court stated that theft is "a
word of general and broad connotation, intended to cover and covering
any criminal appropriation of another's property to the use of the taker,
particularly including theft by swindling, false pretenses, and any other
form of guile.'" 72 Along the same line, the court stated that "the exact
nature of the crime. . . is of little importance so long as it amounts to
theft."7
3
More importantly, the court also held that whether a loss from
theft occurs depends upon the law of the jurisdiction wherein it
occurred.74 Courts have repeatedly cited this proposition and have pro-
ceeded to apply state law without further discussion.75 It might be ar-
gued therefore that they have construed "law of the jurisdiction" to
mean only "state law." This is the position the IRS has taken,76 appar-
ently excluding federal criminal statutes from the concept of "law of
the jurisdiction." However, it must be noted that the courts have never
been required to reach the issue of whether a federal statute meets the
tax law definition of theft.77 Therefore, there has been no discussion of
71. 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956). For an analysis of Edwards, see 10 VAND. L. REV. 153
(1956).
72. 232 F.2d at 110 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at Ili.
74. Id See also J. CHOMMIE, supra note 21, at 160 ("the courts have not limited the concept
of a theft to its common law meaning but have held that it embraces thefts as defined by statute.").
75. Howard v. United States, 497 F.2d 1270, 1272-73 n.4 (7th Cir. 1974), aft'g 32 A.F.T.R.2d
(P-H) 73-5753 (1973) (theft as defined by Illinois statutes); Estate of Max Shlensky, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 628, 631 (1977); Joseph M. Sperzel, 52 T.C. 320, 328 (1969) (petitioner's evidence did not
establish a violation of New York's criminal laws); Robert S. Gerstell, 46 T.C. 161, 172 (1966)
(theft as defined by Pennsylvania law); Michele Monteleone, 34 T.C. 688, 692 (1960) (citing to
Edwards, then defining theft under California Penal Code).
The Edwards majority cited Borden v. Commissioner, 101 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1939). In
Borden, the court concluded that a theft occurred under state law without explaining why it
looked to state law in the first place. Similarly, the Edwards court cited Morris Plan Co., 42 B.T.A.
1190 (1940), acq., 1941 I.R.B. 8, wherein the court made the unexplained assertion that state law
determined whether a theft had occurred. 42 B.T.A. at 1195. Ironically, the Morris case is fre-
quently cited as authority for this assertion. Eg., Michele Monteleone, 34 T.C. 688, 692 (1960);
J.H. McKinley, 34 T.C. 59, 62 (1960). See also McComb v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 725,
729 (1977); Paul C.F. Vietzke, 37 T.C. 504, 510 (1961) (Monteleone cited for same proposition).
76. See, e.g., Rev. RuL 381, 1971-2 C.B. 126; Rev. Rul. 215, 1977-1 C.B. 52 ("The transac-
tion was, under local law, the crime of larceny"); I.R.S., PUB. No. 547, TAX INFORMATION ON
DISASTERS, CASUALTY LOSSES AND THEFTS % 32,621, at 1 (1978).
77. Cf. Curtis H. Muncie, 18 T.C. 849 (1952) (court looked to the Mexican law definition of
theft-since the taxpayer had been swindled in Mexico-and concluded that the taxpayer had
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the applicability of federal criminal laws, much less a decision on this
point.
Properly understood, the Edwards proposition seems unassailable.
It simply asserts that the proper laws to be consulted are those that
were actually relevant to the protection of the taxpayer's property. For
example, if property is taken in North Carolina, then it would be inap-
propriate to consider whether the taking would have been illegal in
Delaware. However, in determining whether the property is protected
by virtue of a criminal theft statute, there is no reason to limit the in-
quiry solely to state criminal law. Neither the Code nor logic supports
the proposition that Congress intended to distinguish takings tfiat are
illegal under state law from takings that are illegal under federal law.
The respective powers of the state and federal governments are
such that state law is the primary law governing most theft situations.78
However, in certain situations the federal government has the power to
create statutory crimes,7 9 and it has availed itself of that power in the
area of securities marketing.8 0 Professor Louis Loss has stated that a
federal-state dichotomy has developed in corporate law; state statutes
are concerned primarily with the internal structure and workings of the
corporation whereas federal law is dominant in the antifraud aspect of
indeed suffered a theft as far as tax law was concerned). In the more recent case of Perry A.
Nichols, 43 T.C. 842 (1965), the tax court noted in dictum that the unlawful activity was pro-
scribed not only by state law but by federal law as well. Id. at 884-85. See also Annot., 62
A.L.R.2d 572, 578 (1958) (statement that whether a loss is due to theft under federal income tax
law depends upon the state or nation in which the theft occurred).
78. A state has broad authority to define what acts are criminal pursuant to its police power.
"The police power of a state today embraces regulations designed to promote the public conven-
ience or the general prosperity as well as those to promote public safety, health, and morals, and is
not confined to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly, or unsanitary, but extends to what
is the greatest welfare of the state." CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVIcE, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 92, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1317 (1972). State law is primary regarding the definition of theft since the federal govern-
ment has no such broad police power to regulate and prescribe punishment. See W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr § 16, at 107.
79. The federal government has the power to create statutory crimes in two situations: first,
when the Constitution expressly grants Congress such power, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (power
to punish counterfeiting, piracies, felonies on high seas, offenses against the law of nations); art.
III, § 3 (power to punish treason); and secondwhen the Constitution gives Congress the power to
do what is "necessary and proper," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, to carry out expressly conferred
powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce, to establish post offices, to tax, etc., W.
LAFAvE & A. ScoTr § 16, at 112.
80. The growth of the federal criminal law is partially attributable to the general increase of
federal regulation which is apparent in the areas of interstate transportation, communications,
wholesomeness of food, marketing of securities, labor relations, etc. See generally Schwartz, Fed-
eral Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 64 (1948).
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corporation law.81 In fact, new state corporation statutes are not at all
concerned with Rule l0b-5-type problems.8
2
Significantly, a major reason given for the enactment of the federal
securities laws was a belief that the states had failed to provide ade-
quate criminal and civil laws to protect the property interests of inves-
tors in their investments.8 3 By enacting section l0b of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act,8 4 Congress has indicated that shareholders'
property interests are important and worthy of protection." Thus, fed-
eral laws which simply augment state criminal laws on illegal takings
ought to be treated the same as state laws for purposes of the federal
income tax.
B. Theft of "Value."
The Securities Exchange Act of 193486 was enacted to regulate the
securities markets and activities of broker-dealers for the protection of
investors.87 Under section 32, Congress authorized the imposition of
criminal sanctions for violations of either the Act or the rules and regu-
81. See Loss, TheAmerican Law Insitute's FederalSecurities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27
(1969):
It is only realistic to recognize that over the last few decades we have been developing a
federal corporation law under the aegis of lOb-5, primarily, and the proxy rules, and that
gradually we seem to be developing a federal-state dichotomy in corporation law, so that
the state statutes seem to be concerned primarily with the internal structure and work-
ings of the corporation, while we are leaving to the federal law the very important aspect
of corporation law that is represented by the fiduciary duty of management, of directors,
and so on.
Id 34. See also Carey, Federalism and Corfporate Law: Relections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 693 (1974) ("Suffice it to say that there has been an explosive development of the law based
upon a few phrases in § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5"). But see Saute Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 479 (1977) (citing with disapproval Carey, supra at 700).
82. "New corporation statutes don't concern themselves very much with the lob-5 type of
problems-fiduciary problems of that sort-and deal not at all with proxy solicitation, but con-
cern themselves with the internal ordering of the corporation primarily." Loss, supra note 81, at
34. However, in Sante Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Supreme Court specifically
refrained from expanding Rule lob-5 to include regulation of "transactions which constitute no
more than internal mismanagement." Id. at 479 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)). The Sante Fe Court stated: "We are reluctant to federalize the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly
where established State policies of corporate regulation would be overridden." 430 U.S. at 479.
83. See 1 A. BROMBERO § 2.7(l)-(2).
84. See note 9 supra.
85. "The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of
stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-the-counter
markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed on
national securities exchanges." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (citing S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934)).
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
87. The 1934 Act also established the SEC, which in turn promulgates rules and regulations.
15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1976).
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lations promulgated pursuant to it.88 Certain provisions of the 1934 Act
render unlawful a type of conduct which, in fact, results in an unlawful
taking of property as interpreted under the tax law definition of theft.
Section 10(b) is a general antifraud provision which makes unlawful
the use of any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security.89 Rule lOb-5 prohibits
(1) the employment of any device, scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) any
misstatement or omission of material fact; and (3) any act, practice or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.90
When a person purchases or sells in the securities market he has
parted with property, namely, money or stock. However, when that
purchase or sale is tainted by a lOb-5 violation, the innocent party has
been unlawfully deprived of his property and the defrauded purchaser
or seller of stock has an implied direct right of action under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 91 The effective deprivation need not always oc-
cur in the purchase or sale, but may also occur in the decrease in the
value of the asset which frequently accompanies the lOb-5 violation.
Clearly, stocks and bonds are property subject to theft under modem
criminal statutes.92 However, in a securities fraud context, the value of
stock may also be the subject of an unlawful taking.
The United States Supreme Court recognized this fact in Blue Ch i
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.93 In Blue Cho the Supreme Court af-
firmed the ruling in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.94 that in order to
have standing to sue for direct relief under Rule lOb-5, the plaintiff
must have been a purchaser or seller of securities. The Court based its
decision on legislative history, lower court decisions, and policy consid-
erations regarding strike suits and otherwise vexatious litigation.95
However, the Court recognized a major failure of the Birnbaum rule:
"The Birnbaum rule undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who have in fact
been damaged by violations of Rule lOb-5, and to that extent it is unde-
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976) ($10,000 fine or five years imprisonment or both).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
90. 17 C.F.RI § 240.10b-5 (1977).
91. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. "Although § 10(b) does not by its terms create
an express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no indication that Congress, or the Commis-
sion when adopting Rule lOb-5, contemplated such a remedy, the existence of a private cause of
action for violations of the statute and the Rule is now well established." Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
92. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr § 90, at 665.
93. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
94. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
95. 421 U.S. at 740-45.
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sirable."' 96 There are three classes of plaintiffs to which the Birnbaum
rule effectively denies a remedy: first, those "who allege that they de-
cided not to purchase because of an unduly gloomy representation or
the omission of favorable material"; second, "actual shareholders in the
issuer who allege that they decided not to sell their shares because of an
unduly rosy representation or a failure to disclose unfavorable mate-
rial"; and third, "shareholders, creditors, and perhaps others related to
an issuer who suffered loss in the value of their investment due to cor-
porate or insider activities in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities which violate Rule lOb-5." 97
Theft loss deductions should not be made available to sharehold-
ers in the first category since such an application of the deduction
would speculatively compensate the taxpayer for gain not received, as
opposed to an actual loss. However, for shareholders in the second and
third categories the theft loss 'deduction would serve as a legitimate and
justifiable remedy. In recognition of the actual loss incurred by these
shareholders, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook98 held that one way they may circumvent the
Birnbaum doctrine is by bringing a derivative action so long as the
corporate issuer is itself a purchaser or seller of securities. Judicial rec-
ognition of the loss incurred by these shareholders and the subsequent
attempt to afford a substituted remedy support the view that it is also
the value of the stock which is the subject of the unlawful taking under
the federal securities laws, not simply the title to the stock.
In summary, when a lOb-5 violation has occurred in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security99 an unlawful taking of prop-
erty has simultaneously occurred. Thus, when a shareholder claims a
loss due to a securities fraud he is also alleging that an unlawful taking
of property has occurred under federal law. However, such an allega-
tion represents only the first part of tax law's bifurcated test for deter-
mining whether a theft has occurred. The second part of the test
requires the taxpayer to allege that the taking was done with criminal
intent. 100
96. Id. at 743.
97. Id. at 737-38.
98. 405 F.2d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see Note, Recklessness
Under Section 10(b): Weathering the Hochfelder Storm, 8 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 325, 330 n.32 (1977).
99. In other words, if a taxpayer is a holder of stock in a corporation in which there has been
a lOb-5 violation and has suffered damage as a result of the fraud, he need only show the IRS that
the fraud was in connection with a purchase or sale of some security. The taxpayer need not be a
purchaser or seller of a security in order to take the theft loss deduction.
100. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 291 F.2d 908,909 (8th Cir. 1961) (income tax defini-
tion of theft "consist[s] only of takings and deprivations in which the element of criminal intent
has been involved.").
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C. The Requirement of Criminal Intent.
An examination of the tax law of theft loss deductions reveals that
the law of the jurisdiction, whether state or federal, is not to be con-
sulted to determine the requisite mental state. For example, petitioners
in Bellis v. Commissioner"0 ' sought to deduct the loss on their invest-
ment in a Las Vegas casino. The stock they purchased had not been
registered for sale by the SEC or the California Corporation Commis-
sion. The tax court denied the deduction on the ground that petitioners
failed to show that the wrongdoers had the requisite criminal intent. 0 2
The court required a showing of criminal intent even though the crime
alleged under the California Corporations Code was a strict liability
offense; the wrongdoer's mental state is irrelevant. 0 3 Other cases sup-
port the assertion that the criminal intent element is a separate and
distinct part of the tax law definition of theft.1°4 Thus, tax law has its
own definition of theft, and the tax court recognized that fact in Bellis
when it denied a theft loss deduction to one taxpayer by asserting that
"petitioner does not reach the threshold point of our broad definition of
theft." 0 This line of cases further illustrates that the law of the juris-
diction is to be consulted only with regard to the definition of an un-
lawful taking.
IV. THE TIMING OF THE DEDUCTION
After satisfactorily alleging both parts of the above test, the tax-
payer must be able to point to some identifiable event which marks his
discovery of the theft and which demonstrates the accuracy of the alle-
101. 61 T.C. 354 (1973), aI'd, 540 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1976).
102. "Without evidence of guilty knowledge or intent . . . petitioner does not reach the
threshold point of our broad definition of theft." 61 T.C. at 357.
103. "California sanctions against selling stock without a permit apply strictly to every such
seller whether he merely makes an honest mistake or is engaged in a malignantly fraudulent
scheme." Id. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 26104 (West 1968) (now codified in CAL. CORP. CODE §§
25166, 25216, 25245, 25400, 25401, 25540, 25541 (West 1977)).
104. See, e.g., Farcasanu v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1970), ag per cur/am,
50 T.C. 881 (1968). In Farcasanu, the circuit court stated:
It is also true that the law of the situs of the taking has generally been the governing
standard for the determination of illegality .... However, the courts in construing this
provision have consistently required that the taking be accompanied by criminal intent
in order to render the taxpayer's loss deductible under section 165.
436 F.2d at 149. For an example of an older decision asserting the same basic proposition, see
Morris Plan Co., 42 B.T.A. 1190, 1195 (1940) ("Clearly there was an intent by the wrongdoer to
convert it; and it seems equally clear that the conversion was accomplished.").
105. 61 T.C. at 357. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, 540 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1976), and reiterated
the tax court's statement. Id. at 449. See also Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 572, 579 (1958) (separating the
analysis of the requisite mental state from the analysis of the definition of theft).
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gation. 10 6 The relationship between the shareholder and the public-is-
sue corporation is principally controlled by intermediaries.10 7
Consequently, those events which pinpoint the year of the loss in the
typical theft situation are inapplicable to the securities fraud situa-
tion. 08 There are, nevertheless, reliable identifiable events which not
only pinpoint the time of the theft but also constitute prima facie evi-
dence that both parts of the theft loss deduction test have been met.
These are certain enforcement actions instituted by the SEC and by
private litigants.
Theft losses are deductible only in the year in which taxpayer dis-
covers the loss.' 0 9 The loss is considered discovered when a reasonable
man under similar circumstances would have become aware of the
loss. 10 Prior to the 1954 Code, the timing rule for theft loss deductions
was the same as that for casualty loss deductions, that is, all section
165(c)(3) losses were deductible in the year in which the loss was sus-
tained."' However, as tax law developed, it became evident that the
theft loss deduction required separate treatment. In Alison v. United
States,"12 the petitioner had been a victim of embezzlement for eight
years but failed to discover the embezzlement until the eighth year. The
effect of this delay in discovery of the loss would have been to deny
taxpayer tax relief for several years of losses, since the taxpayer has
only three years within which to file an amended tax return."i 3 None-
theless, the deduction was allowed in the year the loss was discovered
on the basis that the "essence of embezzlement" was secrecy and that to
deny the deduction would impose undue "hardship and injustice. ' 14
Consequently, when Congress reformed the tax code in 1954, section
165(e) was added which provided that for all losses due to theft, the
year of discovery was the only year in which the theft loss could be
deducted."' Apparently, one reason Congress applied the rule to all
106. An identifiable event fixes the appropriate time for taking the deduction. Boston Con-
sol. Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 473 (Ist Cir. 1942).
107. This Comment focuses on the public-issue corporation. See note 45 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
109. I.R.C. § 165(e).
110. Cramer v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1125, 1134 (1971).
111. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A46 (1954).
112. 344 U.S. 167 (1952).
113. Id. at 168.
114. Id. at 169. See also Rev. Rul. 183, 1953-2 C.B. 143, in which the IRS echoed the Alson
case by stating that "the facts reveal that undue hardship or injustice would result if the loss were
allowed only in the years the embezzlement occurred." Id. at 143.
115. H.R. REp. No. 1337, supra note 111, at A46. See generally 5 J. MERThNs, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION §§ 165, 201-202 (1975); see also Asphalt Indus. v. Commissioner, 411 F.2d 13
(3d Cir. 1969); Jane U. Elliot, 40 T.C. 304 (1963). Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.165 8(b) (1960) (providing
for an exception to the rule as applied to estates).
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theft loss deductions rather than just embezzlement was that there were
other theft crimes capable of being concealed.' 6 Although Congress
may not have had the securities markets in mind, the timing rule facili-
tates the application of the theft loss deduction to the securities fraud
case because most shareholders will not discover that an unlawful ac-
tivity has allegedly occurred until the SEC has brought such informa-
tion to light.
A. Identiable Events in Securities Frauds.
The formal events by which a reasonable shareholder discovers
(either actually or constructively) that he has been the victim of a secur-
ities fraud are the initiation of enforcement action either by the SEC or
by private litigants seeking direct relief. However, these events do more
than merely pinpoint the year of discovery. Further examination of the
tax law of theft loss deductions leads to the conclusion that these events
actually constitute adequate evidence for the two-part definition of
"theft."
Tax law does not require that the victim of a theft pursue any
criminal or civil remedies in order to take the theft loss deduction." 7 In
Bromberg, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the IRS
argument that "in order for a taxpayer to claim a deduction for a loss
from theft, he must show that he has made an effort to and cannot
obtain restitution.""' The court further stated:
The [theft statute under the law of the jurisdiction] makes no such
requirement, and when the nature of the matter dealt with, thieving
and thievery, is considered, it seems clear, we think, that only if there
were a specific provision imposing this requirement, would a court be
authorized to hold that it exists." 9
In Michele Monteleone,120 a taxpayer brought both criminal and civil
proceedings against an alleged swindler whose occupation was to pro-
mote and manage night clubs, restaurants and cocktail lounges. The
defendant stipulated to plaintiff's allegations in the civil proceedings
claiming that he wanted to return the money,' 2' and the criminal in-
116. "In embezzlement and other losses, however, the taxpayer may not find out about the
loss until the statute of limitations has run for the year in which the loss was incurred." H.R. REP.
No. 1337, supra note 111, at 46 (emphasis added).
117. However, failure to accuse suspects or to report the theft to the police has been held to
be a factor against the taxpayer's claimed theft loss. See Sidney Lemmon, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 503
(1968). But see Frederick C. Moser, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1950), where such failure was satisfac-
torily explained.
118. 232 F.2d at ill.
119. Id.
120. 34 T.C. 688 (1960).
121. The defendant's explanation for stipulating to civil liability is very unclear. Id. at 693
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dictment was dismissed for lack of probable cause. 22 Nevertheless,.the
tax court allowed the taxpayer a theft loss deduction, stating that the
defendant's stipulation in the civil proceedings was sufficient proof of
theft and that the taxpayer was only required to prove that the loss was
"occasioned by circumstances clearly indicating theft."'' 23 The result of
the court's holding is that a theft loss deduction may be granted when
the evidence of theft is incomplete. Thus, the dual significance of the
"identifiable events"-SEC enforcement action and private litigants
seeking direct relief-is that they pinpoint the year of discovery and
serve as proof that a loss was "occasioned by circumstances clearly in-
dicating theft."
1. Private Litigation as an Identifiable Event. A shareholder
who institutes a private action seeking direct relief under Rule 1Ob-5
must meet five criteria in order to have standing to sue. First, the plain-
tiff must have been a purchaser or seller of stock.' 24 Second, the de-
fendant must have employed a manipulative or deceptive device.' 25
Third, the deception must go to some material fact.' 26 Fourth, the
plaintiff's reliance on such deception must have caused the damage.'27
n.3. See Spiegel v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9667, at 88,026 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
(taxpayer not entitled to a theft loss since the thief compensated taxpayer with two promissory
notes and a professed intent and ability to repay).
122. 34 T.C. at 694.
123. Id. (citing Warner L. Jones, 24 T.C. 525 (1955)). In Monteleone, the tax court also
stated that "a criminal conviction is not a necessary element in a taxpayer's proof in this Court
that a theft loss has been sustained." 34 T.C. at 694. See also Kennedy v. United States, 109 F.
Supp. 509 (D.R.I. 1952):
The defendant insists that the plaintiff cannot properly deduct the loss because he has
not exhausted his legal remedies against those persons who were under suspicion. Such a
requirement, ho wever, places undue emphasis onform rather than substance. There is noth-
in in the record before the Court which would warrant the institution of either civil or
criminal proceedings against any known person .... The Court believes that plaintiff
did all that could reasonably have been required of him under the circumstances.
Id. at 512 (emphasis added). See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (1960), which provides that "substance
and not mere form shall govern in determining a deductible loss." Furthermore, in Edwards,
Monteleone and Kennedy, the taxpayer was granted the theft loss deduction. For a recent deci-
sion, see Skolnik v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1055 (1971).
124. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Birnbaum v. Newport
Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). See text accompanying notes
98-100 supra.
125. In other words, the defendant must have engaged in a proscribed activity under the
rule. Basically, these fraudulent activities fall into two categories: a false or misleading statement
and a failure to make a statement (omission). See I A. BROMBERG § 2.3(200). See also 37 AM.
JUR. 2d Fraud § 4 (1968).
126. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), though a proxy case, may be con-
strued to define materiality for the purpose of Rule lOb-5. A fact is material "if there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."
Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
127. See text accompanying notes 153-60 infra.
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Finally, the defendant must have possessed the requisite scienter in vio-
lation of the Rule. 2 As will be seen below, proof of the first four ele-
ments satisfies the unlawful taking of property requirement of the theft
loss deduction test and the scienter requirement directly corresponds to
the criminal intent requirement.
The requirement that the shareholder be a purchaser or seller of
securities was discussed earlier. 29 The Supreme Court, in upholding
that requirement for a 10b-5 cause of action, acknowledged its undesir-
ability in that one need not have been a purchaser or seller in order to
have suffered damages as aproximate result of a securities fraud. 30 The
Court's reasons for limiting the class of potential plaintiffs' 3' for pur-
poses of federal securities law are unpersuasive as applied to tax law
since the objective of the theft loss deduction is to provide the taxpayer
with some tax relief for an actual loss.132 Thus, it is sufficient if the
taxpayer merely held the security during the time period in which the
value of the stock decreased as a result of the fraudulent activity.
The second and third requirements of a 10b-5 cause of ac-
tion-that the defendant have employed a manipulative or deceptive
device as to some material fact-correspond to the criminal law notion
of a false representation which, in turn, corresponds to the tax law
meaning of theft. As noted earlier, the tax law meaning of theft is very
broad. Theft includes "swindling, false pretenses, and any other form
of guile."' 3 Consequently, the tax law meaning of "unlawful taking of
property" is not nearly as limited or as technical as the meaning which
the criminal law imports to that phrase. The criminal law meaning of
"taking" arose specifically in reference to the crime of larceny. "The
defendant does not commit larceny of another's property unless he
'takes' it in the sense of securing dominion over it." '134 For purposes of
tax law, a Treasury regulation provides that embezzlement is included
128. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See text accompanying note 161
infra.
129. See text accompanying notes 93-98 supra.
130. See text accompanying note 96 supra. See also 1 A. BROMBERG § 4.7(560)-(567). "The
battle over the validity and desirability of the [purchaser-seller] requirement has been fierce and
inconclusive." Id. § 4.7(567).
131. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
132. "The regulations in turn refer to losses 'actually sustained during the taxable period,' as
fixed by 'identifiable events.' Such unmistakeable phraseology compels the conclusion that a loss,
to be deductible under § 23(e) [now I.R.C. § 165(c)(3)], must have been sustained infact during
the taxable year." Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 292 (1945) (emphasis in original). The
time for deducting a theft loss is the year of discovery. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
133. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956).
134. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr § 86, at 631.
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in the tax law meaning of theft.'3 5 Yet, a "taking" is not an element of
the criminal law definition of embezzlement. Instead, embezzlement is
the fraudulent "conversion" of the property of another by one who is
already in lawful possession of it.' 36 "A conversion of property requires
a serious act of interference with the owner's rights." '137 Moreover,
"[e]mbezzlement statutes often are worded in terms of the wrongdoer's
conversion to his own use. These words are not to be taken literally,
however, for it is not a requirement for a conversion that the converter
gain a personal benefit from his dealing with the property."'1 38 Lastly,
the requisite mental state for the crime of embezzlement is the specific
intent to defraud. 3" Likewise, the tax court has permitted a theft loss
deduction where the taxpayer has suffered loss as a result of a false
pretense or fraud.14°
The false pretense provisions of state law under which the theft
loss deduction has been granted were statutory enactments of common
law fraud, as is Rule lOb-5. In general, common law fraud 14 is "know-
ingly and designedly obtaining the property of another by means of
untrue representations of fact with intent to defraud.' 1 42 The five gen-
eral standing requirements of Rule lOb-5 closely parallel those of com-
mon law fraud. 143 A major distinction between the two is that Rule
1Ob-5 includes relief for nondisclosure of material facts, whereas non-
disclosure was rarely actionable under common law fraud. 44 Other-
wise there is no significant difference between the two, at least insofar
as the victim is concerned. 14  The distinctions between various theft
135. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(d) (1960).
136. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT § 89, at 644.
137. Id. § 89, at 645.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Bellis v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 354, 357 (1973), afi'd, 540 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1976)
(fraud included in the tax law meaning of theft); Evelyn Nell Norton, 40 T.C. 500 (1963), aft'd,
333 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1964); Michele Monteleone, 34 T.C. 688 (1960)).
141. The crime of false pretenses was created by a 1757 English statute which, although not
enacted early enough to become technically a part of the common law in this country, has been
generally accepted as a part of our common law. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 297 (2d ed. 1969).
142. Id.
143. See 1 A. BROMBERG § 2.7(1).
144. Id. "IThe common law concept of fraud under the securities laws has now been en-
larged under Rule lOb-5 to include even innocent nondisclosures which may amount to manipula-
tive or deceptive conduct." Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S.
951 (1968).
145. Note, FederalIncome Tax: The Dilemma ofthe Casualty Loss Deduction, 1961 DUKE L.
J. 440. "From the taxpayer's standpoint there is no difference between loss by theft and loss due to
misrepresentation." Id. 444 (citing R. PERKINS, supra note 141, at 319). See also Haimoff, Holmes
Looks at Hochfelder and lOb5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147, 148-49 (1976) (arguing that the scienter re-
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crimes serve no useful purpose either in the criminal law 46 or in securi-
ties fraud cases.
The legislative expansion of common law fraud was necessary to
provide adequate protection of property. 47 The common law re-
sponded to the comparatively simple needs of the time.148 "Men had
time to make their own investigations and usually did so, and it was not
considered sound business or good common sense to rely on the mere
oral statement of another."149 In fact, the rationale for first imposing
criminal sanctions on certain fraudulent conduct' 5° was that "the use of
ordinary precaution and prudence would not be an adequate protection
against [those] type[s] of fraud."'' Consequently, in light of the com-
plex structure of the market system and the lack of opportunity of the
shareholder to investigate statements by or about a corporation which
are reported to the press, it became imperative that the law of criminal
fraud expand into the area of the securities markets.'5 2
A securities fraud under Rule lOb-5 is the counterpart of common
law fraud in the context of the marketing of securities. Given the inclu-
sion of fraud in the tax law definition of theft, and given that a securi-
ties fraud closely approximates a crime which is already included in the
tax law meaning of theft, it is reasonable to conclude that a securities
fraud should fall within that sphere of crimes to which the theft loss
deduction applies.
The fourth general standing requirement for a Rule lOb-5 cause of
action is that the plaintiff's reliance on such deception must have
quirement, as defined in Hochfelder, is the equivalent of the mental state requirement of common
law fraud).
146. R PERKINS, supra note 141, at 319.
147. Id. 232.
148. Id. 231.
149. Id.
150. Originally, there was no criminal penalty for taking property under false pretenses ex-
cept where false tokens were used. Id.
151. Id. Although only personal movable things could be the objects of the crime under the
common law, statutes have expanded the application of the crime to acts such as fraudulent adver-
tisement, unauthorized wearing of a badge or garb of a secret society with intent to deceive, ob-
taining food or lodging at a hotel with intent to defraud and circulation of false rumors as to
stocks and bonds with intent to affect the market price. Id. 297-98.
152. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Although this case
concerned the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, the Supreme Court, in reference to practices
proscribed under the securities laws which operate as a fraud or deceit, stated that "the courts
have adapted the common law of fraud to the commercial transactions of our society." Id. at 192.
In fact, one treatise suggests that it was the securities markets which helped develop common law
fraud. "The common law of deceit, in fact, has developed to some extent in the context of fraud in
the sale of securities." H. BLOOMENTHAL & S. WING, SECURITIES LAW § 8.07, at 8-72 (1973)
(citing Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337, 55 Li. Ch. 864 (1889)). See also Haimoff, supra note 145,
at 163.
Vol. 1978:8491
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
caused the damage. As noted earlier, 53 the IRS has denied a theft loss
deduction to a defrauded investor where the investor purchased his
shares on the open market and consequently was not in privity with the
malefactors. Perhaps this holding is correct as applied to state law,
which was the law under which the taxpayer had alleged that a theft
had occurred. However, "privity between plaintiffs and defendants is
not a requisite element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action for damages."'
t5 4
"In short, causation as an element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action can
be established notwithstanding lack of privity."'
l5
According to Professor Bromberg, causation can be broken down
into two elements: the violation must have caused the loss afid the vio-
lation must have caused the transaction. 6 For loss causation to exist
the shareholder must be able to show direct economic harm.' 57 Such
loss is reflected in the decrease in the value of the stock. Transaction
causation requires that the plaintiff relied on the deception upon enter-
ing the transaction.15 8 In cases of nondisclosure of material facts, trans-
action causation is easily proven as a result of the Supreme Court's
holding in Affiliated Vie Citizens v. United States'5 9 that in such cases
reliance will be assumed. In cases of misstatements of material fact, the
plaintiff must show that the alleged fraud induced his purchase or
sale. 160
However, a shareholder does not have standing to sue unless he
alleges that the wrongdoer possessed the appropriate scienter. Likewise,
the second part of the theft loss deduction test is that the taxpayer must
allege that the illegal act was accompanied by criminal intent. Gener-
ally, crime requires a specific state of mind which is variously called
153. See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
154. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir.
1974). But cf Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977)
(where insider trading had no effect on market price or plaintiff's portfolio decisions, defendants
are not liable to traders on the open market).
155. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir.
1974). See also Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971), where the Tenth Circuit stated that "the first step is to realize that the common law
requirement of privity has all but vanished from lOb-5 proceedings while the distinguishable 'con-
nection' element is retained." 446 F.2d at 101.
156. 2 A. BROMBERG § 4.7(551). See also Note, Causation andLiablil yin Private Aclionsfor
Proxy Violations, 80 YALE L.J. 107, 123-24 (1970).
157. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974) (there must be
direct economic harm).
158. "This kind of causation ... tests whether the violation caused the transaction in ques-
tion. . . . Causation in such a situation contemplates that plaintiff is the decision maker in the
transaction, and that his compensable loss flows from the distortion of his decisional process by
the violation." 2 A. BROMBERG § 4.7(551)(2).
159. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
160. See 1 A. BROMBERG 4.7(551)(2), at 86.6.
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mens rea, scienter or criminal intent.' 6 '
For purposes of tax law, a showing of criminal intent requires evi-
dence of guilty knowledge or intent.'62 Because of the considerable in-
consistency in terminology encountered when making comparisons of
different bodies of law,'63 this Comment will use the Model Penal Code
definitions.'1 Accordingly, the four kinds of mental states, in order of
increasing culpability, are: (1) negligence, 165 (2) recklessness (which in-
cludes gross negligence), 166 (3) knowledge 67 and (4) purposefulness 168
(which has the same meaning as intent 69 and design170).
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,'7' the Supreme Court stated in
dictum that an action for damages under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
will not lie in the absence of an allegation of an intent to deceive, ma-
161. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr § 27, at 192.
162. See Bellis v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 354, 357 (1973), aI'd, 540 F.2d 448 (9th Cir.
1976).
163. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT § 27, at 192-95.
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
165. Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's
failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circum-
stances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reason-
able person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
166. Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, con-
sidering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to
him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
Id. § 2.02(2)(c) (emphasis added).
167. Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circum-
stances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist;
and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically
certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
168. Purposey.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the exist-
ence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
Id. § 2.02(2).
169. " ' [I ] ntentionally' or 'with intent' means purposely." Id. § 1.13(12).
170. "'[P]urposely' has the same meaning specified in Section 2.02 and equivalent terms
such as 'with purpose,' 'designed' or 'with design' have the same meaning." Id. § 1.13(11).
171. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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nipulate or defraud.1 72 Clearly, Hoch/elder eliminates the first mental
state-negligence-as a basis on which to bring a private lOb-5 ac-
tion.1 73 However, there is considerable debate as to whether an allega-
tion of recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement of
Rule lOb-5. 1 74 In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court stated: "We need not
address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless be-
havior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."'175
On the other hand, the reckless behavior to which the Supreme Court
referred was recklessness which is considered to be aform of intentional
conduct.1 76 Thus, recklessness, as defined by the Model Penal Code,
will not satisfy the scienter requirement since knowing or intentional
conduct is not included in the Code definition of recklessness.'
77
Although it was not so held in Hochfelder, the Supreme Court
used the phrase "knowing or intentional conduct" in reference to the
mental state which satisfied the scienter requirement for private 1Ob-5
actions.1 78 Likewise, the tax court in Bellis, defined criminal intent as
"guilty knowledge or intent" '17 9 and in a 1971 revenue ruling the IRS
172. Id. at 193.
173. "The judicially created private damage remedy under § 10(b). . . cannot be extended,
consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent wrongdoing." Id. at 210.
174. See, e.g., Pitt, U.S. Supreme Court Must Resolve Uncertainties Caused by Hochfelder,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 30, col. 1, 55, col. 2. The following cases have allowed recovery for
reckless conduct: Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen
Co. Inc., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th
Cir. 1977); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976);
Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
175. 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
176. "In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be aform of intentional conduct
for purposes of imposing liability for some act." Id. (emphasis added). See SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1243 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd on other grounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d
Cir. 1977) (Hochfelder scienter requirement "leads to the conclusion that only. . . 'the kind of
recklessness that is equivalent to wilfull fraud'. . . serves as a basis of liability"). See also Bailey
v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976) (corporation liable for reckless conduct under
lob-5 where "blinded by conflict of interest" it "wantonly ignored" readily available evidence of
the unfairness of a proposed acquisition).
177. See note 166 supra. The Model Penal Code definition of recklessness describes that
mental state as a conscious disregard of a risk. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(s)(c) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). A risk is defined as a ."chance of injury." WEBSTER's NEw WORLD DICnrONARY 1228
(2d ed. 1972). However, recklessness under the Model Penal Code does not require that the actor
be "practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result," which is one of the requirements
for acting knowingly. See note 167 supra. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that for recklessness
to be a form of intentional conduct there must be a conscious disregard for a chance of injury and
that chance must be so great that the actor is practically certain that his conduct will cause such an
injury. The distinction is one of degree of probability. See Haimoff, supra note 145, at 149-50
(discussion of Holmes' general theory of tort law and the application of that theory to fraud).
178. 425 U.S. at 197.
179. "Without evidence of guilty knowledge or intent on Jansen's part petitioner does not
reach the threshold point of our broad definition of theft." 61 T.C at 357.
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granted a theft loss deduction, finding that the wrongdoer acted "know-
ingly, with intent to defraud."' 80 Thus, a strong argument can be made
that the criminal intent standard in the theft loss deduction test is the
equivalent of the scienter requirement in private lOb-5 actions.
At this point it is important to reiterate that the taxpayer who is
seeking the theft loss deduction is required to prove only that the loss
was "occasioned by circumstances clearly indicating theft."'' Suppose,
for example, that a taxpayer who has owned shares in a corporation for
several years notices a sudden and dramatic decrease in the value of his
stock. This event in itself is not a circumstance clearly indicating theft.
However, if, after noticing such a decrease, the taxpayer learns (either
actually or constructively) that other shareholders are seeking private
damages under Rule lOb-5 and have standing to sue under Rule lOb-5,
then an identifiable event occurs enabling the taxpayer to "officially"
discover his loss. Assuming that the party instituting suit has presented
a colorable claim, not only does the identifiable event fix the year of
discovery for the taxpayer, but it also serves as proof that the taxpayer's
loss was the result of a theft. The taxpayer himself need not have stand-
ing to sue in order to claim damage as a result of a securitiesfraud. "For
§ 10(b) bans the use of any deceptive device in the 'sale' of any security
by 'any person.' "182 The Supreme Court recognized in Blue Chip that
one may not have standing to sue under Rule lOb-5 and yet may still be
damaged as a proximate result of a lOb-5 violation since a decline in
the value of stock affects all stockholders. 183 Thus, all the taxpayer need
allege to provide the I.R.S. with an identifiable event is that he was a
holder of the security during the decrease in value, that there is some-
one who has standing to bring a private lOb-5 action and that the suit
against the corporate malefactors presents a colorable claim.
2. SEC Enforcement Proceedings as Identifying Events. SEC en-
forcement proceedings may also function as timing or identifying
For a recent decision interpreting the criminal intent element see James Godine, Jr., 36
T.C.M. 1595 (CCH) T 34,739, at 1598 (1977) (theft loss deduction denied because petitioner failed
to prove that defendant "knowingly and designedly" made false statements) (citing Norton v.
Commissioner, 333 F.2d 1005 (9th Cir. 1964)).
Regarding the combination of knowledge and/or intent it should be noted that "[t]he word
'intent' in the substantive criminal law has generally not been limited to the narrow, dictionary
definition of purpose, aim, or design, but that it has often been viewed as encompassing much of
what would ordinarily be described as knowledge." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment (rent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
180. Rev. Rul. 381, 1971-2 C.B. 126.
181. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
182. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 8 (1971) (emphasis ad-
ded).
183. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
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events. Section 32 of the 1934 Act imposes criminal sanctions for viola-
tions of the Act or the rules and regulations promulgated under it. 184
During fiscal year 1976, the SEC referred 116 cases to the Department
of Justice for criminal prosecution, of which 97 resulted in convic-
tions.' 85 The statutory provision defining a criminal violation requires
"willfulness,"' t86 rendering the quality and quantity of evidence needed
to maintain a criminal action at least as great as that required for a
private lOb-5 action. Clearly, the elements of a private lOb-5 action and
a criminal action are very similar.' 87
Probable cause must exist before the Justice Department can pro-
ceed to prosecute the alleged perpetrators of the fraud. Yet, the tax-
payer is required to show only that there are circumstances which
clearly indicate theft.'88 In Monteleone, the tax court granted a theft
loss deduction despite the fact that criminal proceedings brought
against the alleged swindler were terminated with the dismissal of both
the indictment and the information for lack of probable cause.' 89
184. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
185. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 42D ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SEC, H.R.
Doc. No. 21, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 206-07 (1977):
CRIMINAL CASES
Number of
cases
referred to
Justice Number of Defendants
Fiscal Year Department Indictments Indicted Convictions
1967 44 53 213 127
1968 40 42 123 84
1969 37 64 213 83
1970 35 36 102 55
1971 22 16 83 89
1972 38 28 67 75
1973 49 40 178 83
1974 67 40 169 81
1975 88 53 199 116
1976 116 23 118 97
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976). The imprisonment sanction will not be imposed if the violator
can establish that he had no knowledge of the statute. Id. However, this defense has not been
prevalent. See 4 A. BROMBERG § 10.3.
187. "[P]recedents established in civil cases interpreting Rule lob-5 are applicable in crimi-
nal prosecutions under the Rule ...." United States v. Chanay, 537 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976). The circuit court in Charnay concluded that manipulation
meant the same in criminal lob-5 cases as in civil lob-5 cases. 537 F.2d at 348-51. Under the
Model Penal Code definitions of the various types of mental states, willfulness is equivalent to
intentional conduct. See notes 167-68 supra.
188. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
189. 34 T.C. at 693-94.
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Therefore, the institution of a criminial proceeding, insofar as it re-
quires probable cause, is a circumstance which indicates the likelihood
that a theft has occurred. Of course, the stockholder who uses the crimi-
nal proceeding as an identifiable event still must be able to show causa-
tion, that is, that his loss was a proximate result of the unlawful
activity. This is a question of fact to be resolved on the basis of the
substantiality of the loss involved and the temporal relationship be-
tween taxpayer's ownership of stock, the time at which the SEC alleged
that the fraud occurred, and the institution of the SEC proceeding.
Other possible identifying events are SEC proceedings triggered
by alleged lOb-5 violations. The Commission has the discretion to de-
cide whether or not to commence proceedings."' 0 Where lOb-5 is con-
cerned, an SEC enforcement proceeding can be commenced whenever
a material misrepresentation, misleading omission or other deception
or manipulation'9 1 occurs in connection with a purchase or sale of a
security.192 The enforcement measures available to the SEC to combat
such violations include suspension of trading,193 injunctions and sus-
pension of registration with the Commission. 194 For example, in order
for the SEC to obtain a preliminary injunction, it must present prima
facie evidence that an individual's conduct constitutes a violation of the
antifraud provisions and that the individual's conduct indicates a rea-
190. See, e.g., SEC v. Aldred Investment Trust, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L
REP. (CCH) 1 91,349 (D.C.N.Y., Dec. 24, 1963).
191. 1 A. BROMBERG § 10.1 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulpher Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 277-78
(S.D.N.Y 1966), modfed, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
192. It is not necessary that the SEC be a purchaser or seller to pursue enforcement proceed-
ings. Cf. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (buyer-seller require-
ment waived in shareholder injunction suits).
193. See note 3 supra. Between February 11, 1959 and June 30, 1977, the SEC suspended
trading in approximately 933 issues. Memorandum from SEC Division of Enforcement, Branch of
Market Surveillance (July 7, 1977) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Although activities other
than fraudulent conduct often precipitate trading suspensions, the suspension period is generally
longer when fraudulent conduct is suspected. For example, in Continental Vending Machine
Corp., trading was suspended from March 8, 1963 to June 2, 1976; in Equity Funding Corp. of
America, the suspension period was from March 28, 1973 to October 17, 1976; and in Home-Stake
Production Co., trading was suspended from August 8, 1973 to May 17, 1974. Id.
Although the incidence of securities fraud may appear quantitatively small, it must be
remembered that a lOb-5 violation which causes a decline in the value of even one corporation
could affect thousands of shareholders. For example, one Fortune 500 corporation, the DuPont
Company, reports that its 48,291,708 shares of outstanding common stock are owned by 204,665
individual shareholders. [1976] E.I. DUPONT DE NEMOURS & Co., ANNUAL REPORT 1. Presuma-
bly, the majority of individual shareholders are also individual taxpayers and not corporations or
partnerships. See note 23 supra. In 1975, there were 18,112,000 individual shareholders with an-
nual incomes under $25,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1976 at 497 (97th ed.) (citing NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., CENSUS OF
SHAREOWNERS (1975)).
194. See note 4 supra.
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sonable likelihood of future violations. 195 Such a standard parallels the
tax law requirement that a taxpayer's loss be occasioned by circum-
stances clearly indicating theft.' 96
Since an SEC proceeding has been defined as any action taken by
the SEC directed by a formal order, 197 such SEC activities as no-action
letters should not be used as identifiable events for tax purposes. 98
Identifiable events should consist only of those proceedings as to which
the Commission has issued a final order since only final orders are re-
viewable in the courts. 199 Upon review, SEC findings of fact are con-
clusive if supported by substantial evidence."z°
As with SEC referrals to the Department of Justice for criminal
proceedings, the taxpayer must still be able to show causation.20 1
Again, this will require proof of issues of fact.
Unfortunately, the use of the SEC proceeding as an identifiable
event presents some problems. For SEC enforcement proceedings to
serve as identifiable events, the SEC must allege knowing or intentional
conduct, the same mental state a taxpayer must allege in order to suc-
cessfully deduct his loss as a "theft." Yet, there is considerable uncer-
tainty as to whether the Hochfelder scienter requirement is applicable
to the Commission in its various enforcement proceedings, 20 2 despite
the fact that the Supreme Court spoke in terms of the language of sec-
tion 10(b), not in terms of the language of section 10(b) as applied only
to private actions.z°3 Several district courts have held or indicated in
195. See, e.g., SEC v. Charles A. Morris & Assoc., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Tenn.
1973).
196. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
197. United States v. Batten, 226 F. Supp. 492 (D.D.C.), af 'd without op., (D.C. Cir. Oct. 15,
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 912 (1965).
198. No-action letters are letters in which members of the SEC staff advise the person solicit-
ing its views that, under a described set of facts, the staff would not recommend that the Commis-
sion take any action. [1972] 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 134. They are available to the public 30
days after the response is sent. The SEC is not bound by the informal expression of opinion
contained therein. Id.
199. See Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (a no-action letter is not a Com-
mission order).
200. See Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940).
201. See text accompanying notes 156-57 supra (the violation must have caused the loss).
202. See Pitt, supra note 174, at 55, col. 2.
203. For example, the Court stated that "It]he words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in
conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe
knowing or intentional conduct." Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197. In short, the Court looked to the
common meaning of manipulation and deception and concluded that intentional wrongdoing was
that common meaning. Id. at 214.
Actually, the conclusion that one scienter standard applies to all proceedings brought under
section 10(b) would be consistent with the Supreme Court's earlier view, as articulated in SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), that section 10(b) is the counterpart to
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dicta that Hochfelder applies to any proceeding brought under 10b-5,
whether by private shareholders or by the Commission.2 °4 Likewise,
Professor Bromberg has commented that "[i]t should not be substan-
tively easier for the SEC to achieve this [private relief] than for injured
individuals."2 "5 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however,
has held that the Hochfelder scienter requirement does not apply to
the Commission in its own injunctive proceedings.20 6
In view of the uncertainty in this area, the SEC may continue to
institute proceedings based on allegations of recklessness, common-law
fraud or even negligent misconduct.0 7 Thus, the validity of the SEC
proceeding as an identifiable event indicating the likelihood of tax law
theft is debatable unless the SEC clearly asserts in the market release
that knowing or intentional misconduct has occurred.
In summary, the private action, SEC referrals to the Justice De-
partment for criminal proceedings and perhaps SEC enforcement pro-
ceedings are all identifiable events which could be used by the taxpayer
not only to pinpoint the year of discovery, but also to serve as a circum-
stance clearly indicating that a theft has occurred within the meaning
of theft under tax law.
V. A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF RECOVERY AND THE TAX-BENEFIT
RULE
A theft loss is not deductible under section 165 if there is a rea-
sonable prospect of recovery.20" Whether a reasonable prospect of re-
covery exists is a question of fact to be resolved upon an examination
common law fraud in the context of the securities markets. See text accompanying notes 141-152
supra. In Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1926), which concerned the sale of stock on
false prospectuses, the Second Circuit noted that, as far as the common law was concerned, the
same rules of fraud applied in criminal as in civil cases, and that "only the necessary quantum of
probative force changes." Id. at 329. See Haimoff, supra note 145, at 157-58. See also United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 808 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). Since the
mental state requirement in common law fraud is the same in criminal as in civil cases, it would be
consistent with common law fraud to require the same mental state within the various civil pro-
ceedings whether brought by private litigants or the SEC.
204. See SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (Hochfelder fully applicable
to SEC injunction proceedings); SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va.
1977), appealpending, No. 77-1839 (4th Cir.) (Hochfelder applies to SEC injunctive proceedings);
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1243 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aj'don other grounds,
565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977) (in dictum court indicated Hochfelder should be fully applicable to SEC
enforcement proceedings).
205. 4 A. BROMBERG § 10.1.
206. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).
207. See generally Pitt, supra note 174, at 55, col. 2; see also Note, supra note 98, at 327
n.14, 352.
208. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(a)(2) (1960).
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of all the facts and circumstances.20 9 In Ramsay Scarleut & Co. v.
Commissioner,210 the tax court stated that a "reasonable prospect of
recovery exists when the taxpayer has bona fide claims for recoupment
from third parties or otherwise, and when there is a substantial possi-
bility that such claims will be decided in his favor. ' 21 1 This standard is
to be applied by foresight such that only those facts reasonably foresee-
able as of the close of the taxable year are considered.212 If a taxpayer
determines, as of the last day of the taxable year in which the theft was
discovered, that he has a reasonable prospect of recovering all or some
part of the loss, then he must postpone the deduction until he can be
reasonably certain such reimbursement will not be received.21 3
The reasonable prospect of recovery rule is a corollary to the gen-
eral tax law rule that losses must be evidenced by "closed and com-
pleted transactions. '21 4 There is, however, an exception to the
completed transaction rule for worthless securities.21 5 The worthless se-
curities deduction permits the taxpayer to treat a decline in the value of
stock as a capital loss arising from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset so long as worthlessness can be established.21 6 The test of worth-
lessness is whether a "prudent businessman would have ascertained the
stock to be worthless. 2 17 In comparison, in the reasonable prospect of
recovery test, whether there is a reasonable prospect of recovery is a
question of fact to be resolved upon examination of all the facts and
circumstances.2 18 Neither the theft loss provision nor the worthless se-
curities provision require the taxpayer to pursue measures to recoup the
loss. 2 19 However, the worthlessness test and the reasonable prospect of
recovery test do not require the same burden of proof and it was upon
this point that the IRS erred in Revenue Ruling 77-18.220
209. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (1960).
210. 61 T.C. 795 (1974).
211. Id. at 811-12 (citing Estate of Scofield v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 154, 159 (6th Cir.
1959)). See also Foundation Co., 14 T.C. 1333, 1351, 1354 (1950). Also see Boehm v. Commis-
sioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945), where the Supreme Court upheld a tax court case which found that a
taxpayer had no reasonable prospect of recovery since there was no "substantial value to the suit."
Id. at 294.
212. 61 T.C. at 811.
213. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(2)(i) (1960).
214. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(d)(1) (1960).
215. I.R.C. § 165(g). See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
216. I.R.C. § 165(g)(1).
217. 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 115, § 28.65, at 291.
218. Id.
219. Regarding the theft loss deduction, see text accompanying note 141 supra. Regarding
the worthless securities deduction, see J. CHOMMIE, supra note 21, § 61.
220. 1977-1 C.B. 46. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra. See also Rev. Rul. 381, 1971-
34 I.R.B. 12 (taxpayer was entitled to theft loss when loans became worthless).
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The worthlessness test requires the taxpayer to prove that "[t]he
last vestige of value has disappeared" from the stock.221 Such an oner-
ous burden is generally carried when a corporation is dissolved or liq-
uidated; however, dissolution or liquidation is not required.22 This
burden is so heavy that one commentator has stated that "[t]he right to
the deduction may often be chimerical unless this difficulty is honestly
recognized."2 23
On the other hand, the reasonable prospect of recovery test re-
quires the taxpayer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence224 ei-
ther that he has no bona fide claims for recoupment or that there is no
substantial possibility that his bona fide claims will be decided in his
favor.225 This formulation was the result of a rebuttable presumption,
articulated in Estate of Scofield v. Commissioner,226 that "where a tax-
payer is in good faith willing to go to the trouble and expense of insti-
tuting suit. . . there is as a matter of fact sufficient chance of at least
part of recovery to justify that the taxpayer defer the claim. . . until
the litigation in question is concluded. '227 Since the taxpayer's subjec-
tive opinion as to the success of litigation is not controlling228 and, in
fact, may carry little probative force under the facts and circumstances
of any given case,229 the above test should be viewed as an objective
one.230 Thus, a reformulation of the presumption is that if any part of a
class of taxpayers who have suffered a loss due to theft brings suit to
recover damages, then a reasonable prospect of recovery exists.
Clearly, there is a considerable difference in the burden of proof
between the two tests. In the worthlessness test the burden is to show
that no value exists in the stock whatsoever. If the reasonable prospect
of recovery test were meant to be as burdensome as the worthlessness
test, the theft loss deduction would be denied whenever a mere
possibility of recovery existed. On the contrary, the applicable standard
for the reasonable prospect of recovery test is whether there is a sub-
221. Bodzy v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting'Miami Beach Bay
Shore Co. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1943)).
222. 5 J. MERTENS, supra note 115, § 28.65, at 291.
223. Id. § 28.65, at 292.
224. Spiegel v. United States, 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9667, at 88,206 (S.D. Fla. 1975)
(conclusion of law # 4). See also Hudock v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 351, 361 (1975).
225. See authority cited in note 195 supra.
226. 266 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1959).
227. Id. at 159.
228. See United States v. White Dental Co., 274 U.S. 398, 403 (1927).
229. See Ramsay Scarlett & Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 795, 812-13 (1974).
230. See Parmelee Transp. Co. v. United States, 315 F.2d 619, 628 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Estate of
Scofield v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 154, 163 (6th Cir. 1959).
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slant/alpossibility that bona fide claims will be decided in taxpayer's
favor.
Assuming the small investor has overcome the numerous obstacles
to bringing a class action for damages,23' then the rebuttable presump-
tion contained within the reasonable prospect of recovery test results in
an inference that all members of that class action have a reasonable
prospect of recovery. However, such a presumption can be rebutted,
albeit with difficulty, by an individual investor if that investor opts out
of the class and otherwise presents objective facts evidencing the un-
likelihood of recovery.12 Moreover, the presumption articulated in
Scofield did not arise in the context of class actions.2 33 Thus, the rele-
vance of such a test to a defrauded shareholder is debatable since most
members of the class do not go to any trouble or expense to institute
suit. Nonetheless, the fact that there were common victims of the al-
leged theft who thought the suit worth pursuing lends support to the
application or modified application of this rebuttable presumption.
In Revenue Ruling 77-18,234 the IRS held that bankruptcy reor-
ganization or recission of a merger tainted by fraud could serve as a
recovery.235 Such a holding is not a fair application of the reasonable
prospect of recovery test as applied to shareholders. A bankruptcy reor-
ganization is subject to the "absolute priority" rule which means that
[e]ach class of creditors and shareholders, beginning with the most
senior, highest priority claim, must receive under the plan securities
or other consideration fully equal in value to their preexisting inter-
ests before the next junior class may receive anything, thus, share-
holders may receive nothing in a corporation insolvent in the
bankruptcy sense; common shareholders may only participate after
preferred shareholders have received the full equivalent of their liq-
uidation preferences.2 36
231. See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
232. See, e.g., Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945). "The mere fact that defendants
were financially responsible does not necessarily inject any recognizable value into the suit from
the stockholders' viewpoint. Hence it was reasonable to conclude that all value had departed from
the stock prior to 1937 and that there was nothing left except a claim for damages against third
parties for destruction of that value." Id. at 294-95. See also Ramsay Scarlett & Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C. 795 (1974). "Nor does the fact of a future settlement of favorable judicial action on
the claim control our determination, if we find as of the close of the particular year, no reasonable
prospect of recovery existed." Id. at 811-12.
233. Estate of Scofield v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 1959). Scoield involved
a successor-trustee of a testamentary trust who brought suit against the original trustee for breach
of trust and diversions of trust assets.
234. 1977-1 C.B. 46. See text accompanying notes 40-43 supra.
235. 1977-1 C.B. at 47.
236. H. HENN, supra note 12, § 388, at 833.
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Given that common shareholders are the last to be compensated by a
corporation which is in the situation of either having an excess of liabil-
ities over assets or being unable to pay debts as they mature,237 the
possibility of recovery for such shareholders is clearly not substantial.
Likewise, rescission of a merger is an unlikely remedy. Because
"[r]escission calls for cancellation of the bargain, and the return of the
parties to the status quo ante"238 it is rarely a remedy either sought by
the plaintiff or awarded by the court.239 Whenever suit is brought long
after the transaction in question240 or whenever the current market
price is below the tender offer price,241 then rescission is an inappropri-
ate remedy. Thus, it is the fluctuating nature of the stock market itself
that renders rescission an unlikely remedy.242
Another reason why the courts should be liberal in their applica-
tion of the reasonable prospect of recovery test to the securities fraud
situation is the tax benefit rule. The tax benefit rule provides that if a
taxpayer took a deduction for which he received a tax benefit only to
recover part or all of the loss in a subsequent year, then the recovery in
the subsequent year will be recognized as gross income.243 The determi-
nation of when a loss is to be deducted calls for a practical test.2' The
average investor in the securities markets is "at a serious disadvantage
in dealing with persons possessing superior knowledge, skill and re-
sources." 245 This disadvantage also exists regarding the taxpayer's abil-
237. "While insolvency of the bankrupt is not essential under bankruptcy law, it usually
exists and is a relevant factor for various purposes of the law." Id. § 383, at 821. Insolvency in the
bankruptcy sense exists when a corporation has an excess of liabilities over assets, at fair market
value. Insolvency in the equity sense exists when a corporation demonstrates an inability to pay
debts as they mature. Id. § 383, at 821 n.8.
238. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
239. See Comment, Private Remedies 4vailable Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 625-26
(1966). See also Painter, Inside Informatiorn Growing Painsfor the Development ofFederal Corpo-
ration Law Under Rule Job-5, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 1361, 1376 n.56 (1965).
240. See Comment, supra note 239, at 626.
241. 2 A. BROMBERG § 6.3 (1130).
242. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
Piper has come under the dominance of BPC, with many of its management positions
being assumed by BPC officers. It has been operated that way for two or three years.
Divestiture of the ill-gotten shares would not be appropriate under the circumstances of
this case because it would be difficult to administer and would unnecessarily reopen the
control battle. CCI understandably no longer desires to take control of a company that
has been substantially changed. It seeks damages.
480 F.2d at 379.
243. I.R.C. § 111, in conjunction with Treas. Reg. § 1.111-1(a) (1956). See Dobson v. Com-
missioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
244. Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930).
245. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973).
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ity to know his chances of recovery because of the complex nature of
securities fraud litigation, even assuming he has overcome the obstacles
to bringing suit under Rule lOb-5. A lenient application of the reason-
able prospect of recovery test counter-balances the taxpayer's disadvan-
tage. By allowing the theft loss deduction, the taxpayer receives current
compensation for a current loss and the government recognizes that the
taxpayer's assets have been reduced by the amount of the loss. The
result is equitable in that the inclusion of a recovery as gross income
balances the deduction from gross income allowed in the prior year
such that there is no point in time when either the federal government
or the taxpayer are unjustly enriched.
VI. MEASURING THE Loss
For purposes of both theft loss and casualty loss deductions, the
amount of the loss is the lesser of either the difference between the fair
market value of the damaged property immediately before and imme-
diately after the theft or the adjusted basis of the damaged property.246
However, the theft loss deduction is treated uniquely insofar as a regu-
lation provides that the value of the property immediately after the
theft is treated as zero.247 With respect to securities over which the
shareholder can no longer exercise any dominion at the close of the
taxable year, either because the SEC has suspended trading or because
the security is no longer trading on an exchange, this regulation is prac-
tical. However, the stockholder might qualify for the theft loss deduc-
tion even when the stock retains some value. It must be remembered
that the taxpayer is measuring a loss, not worthlessness. In such a case,
the basis rules as applied to casualty losses could be applicable. 248
The application of the tax law theory of measuring damages
caused by a securities fraud presents problems which are beyond the
scope of this Comment. First, few courts have reached the issue of how
to measure damages under Rule lOb-5.249 Second, assuming tax law
limits damages to out-of-pocket loss, the computation is difficult inso-
far as one must discount the effect of normal market fluctuations in the
price of the security. Nonetheless, one commentator has suggested a
formula which would determine the actual value of the stock in ques-
246. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(z)-(ii) (1960).
247. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(c) (1960).
248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-8(c). See also United States v. Rex-
ach, 482 F.2d 10, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U S. 540 (1973).
249. Mullaney, Theories of Measuring in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on
Liability, 46 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 277, 277 (1977).
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tion, absent the effect of fraud.2 50 The premise upon which such a
formula is based is that "the efficiency of the market makes the price at
which a security is actively traded an accurate indication of the true
value of the security. 2 5 1 The lost value which is attributable to the
fraud is determined by conducting an investigation of the historical
performance of an actively traded security which reveals the true value
of the stock as compared to the value of the stock affected by the
fraud.52 The difference is the amount of the theft loss deduction. Con-
sequently, it is the securities markets which facilitate the measurement
of the loss by providing reliable information as to the effect of the fraud
on the security.
VII. CONCLUSION
A theft loss deduction for noncorporate taxpayers who own securi-
ties which have declined in value as a proximate result of a securities
fraud is a feasible solution to the dilemma which currently faces the
small investor. The allowance for loss in this situation may be justified
on intrinsic as well as extrinsic policy considerations.
The definition of theft, for purposes of federal income taxation, in
cludes acts made unlawful by section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Ex-
change Act and by Rule lOb-5. Private actions for damages, SEC pro-
ceedings and SEC referrals to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution are all identifiable events as to which the taxpayer can be
held to have discovered his loss. Furthermore, if the taxpayer can show
either that he has no bona fide claims for recoupment or that, as to his
bona fide claims for recoupment, there is no substantial possibility of
recovery, then he has no reasonable prospect of recovery. Finally, the
securities markets provide reliable information regarding the prices of
securities from which the value of the stolen property can be ascer-
tained.
Although this Comment was limited to a discussion of section
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, and Rule lOb-5, the analysis
may also be applied to other anti-fraud provisions as to which share-
holders have a direct right of action for damages. Moreover, such anal-
ysis is not limited to the securities laws but is potentially applicable to
other federal anti-fraud statutes. In the context of a securities fraud, a
theft loss deduction could provide small investors with some relief for
250. Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371, 385-86 (1974).
251. Id. 396.
252. Id. 397 & app.
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the injury sustained-relief which neither the tax law nor the securities
law has previously provided.
